i  UC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 

I  II  III  I'M"  r  i""ii!^ 


II  III  II I II 111  II  III  III  I II 

AA    000  622  759    9 


WAR    INFORMATION     SERIES 


No.  4 


August.  1917 


THE  GREAT  WAR 

From  SPECTATOR  to  PARTICIPANT 


By, 

ANDREW  c.  Mclaughlin 

PROFESSOR  OF  HISTORY,  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO 


lO/S, 


Published  by  COMMITTEE  ONiPUBLIC  INFORMATION.  Washington.  D.  C. 


THE  GREAT  WAR:  FROM  SPECTATOR 
TO  PARTICIPANT/ 


By  Andrew  C.  McLaughlin,  Professor  of  History,  Univer- 
sity of  Chicago. 

WHEN  the  war  broke  out  in  1014  everyone  in  America 
was  astonished  and  ahnost  everyone  was  quite 
unable  to  understand  the  fundamental  causes  of 
it.  Many  of  us  were  more  than  astonished;  we  were  thor- 
oughly out  of  patience  and  without  inmiediate  and  deep 
sympathies  for  either  side  in  the  struggle.  America  had 
lived  in  isolation.  Though  our  Government  had  been 
to  some  extent  drawn  into  the  swirl  of  world  politics,  we 
had  no  deep-laid  scheme  for  exploitation  of  inferior  races, 
no  colonial  ambitions,  no  determination  to  force  our  prod- 
ucts on  other  nations  and  no  fear  of  neighboring  govern- 
ments. "We  did  not  know  that  we  were  being  jealously 
w^atched  and  that  spies  recorded  our  temper  and  our  frailties. 
"We  did  not  see  that  we  had  anything  to  do  Avith  a  European 
war.  Of  the  ever-vexed  Balkans  we  knew  little  or  nothing, 
though  we  had  heard  of  the  ''sick  man  of  Europe,"  who 
seemed  to  be  an  unconscionable  time  in  shufiling  off  this 
mortal  coil.  We  had  read  of  Hague  conferences  and  peace 
societies  and  peace  palaces,  and  believed  that  war  was  too 
absurd  to  be  really  possible  between  the  nations  of  western 
Europe. 

"With  the  invasion  of  Belgium  we  began  to  rub  our  eyes. 
"We  found  that  a  region  which  had  been  known  as  the 
"cockpit"  of  Europe  was  once  more  to  be  beaten  down  by 
the  tramp  of  alien  armies.  And  then  came  the  stories  of 
atrocities  in  Belgium.  At  first  we  read  with  doubt,  and 
only  after  the  publication  of  the  **Bryce  Report"  with  the 
supporting  documents  did  ^xe  see  the  realities  and  believe 
the  unbelievable.  We  discovered  what  militarism  meant  in 
its  final  qualities,  militarism  which  included  devastation  and 

*  Kevlsed  and  reprinted  from  the  History  Teacher's  Magazine,  June,  1917. 
3S79°— 17  3 


4  THE    GREAT    WAR. 

terrorism  as  portions  of  military  policy.  Belgium  settled 
our  sympathies,  for  we  saw  that  the  whole  thing  was  pre- 
meditated; we  realized  that  methods  of  mobilization,  not  to 
speak  of  strategic  railroads,  are  not  mapped  out  in  a  moment. 
International  bullying,  Machtpolitik,  was  shattered  when  it 
shocked  the  conscience  of  the  world.  John  Bright,  I  believe 
it  was,  said  that  the  only  value  of  war  is  to  teach  geog- 
raphy ;  but  this  war  has  taught  language ;  everybody  knows 
what  Schrecklichkcit  means,  and  everybody  laiows  too  that 
it  is  involved  in  the  philosophy  of  war  when  it  is  carried 
out  with  relentless  thoroughness  and  with  absolute  disre- 
gard of  the  ordinary  promptings  of  humanity. 

The  attempts  of  German  propagandists  to  justify  the 
invasion  showed  an  astonishing  inability  or  rmwillingness 
to  make  frank  use  of  public  documentary  material.  Docu- 
ments found  in  the  Belgium  archives  showed  that  some  years 
ago  an  English  military  officer  and  a  Belgium  official  had 
consulted  together  as  to  what  steps  England  should  take 
in  case  Germany  invaded  Belgium.  After  Germany  had 
done  the  very  thing  which  England  and  Belgium  had  feared, 
German  propagandists  tried  to  justify  her  by  declaring  that 
Belgium  was  considering  means  of  preventing  it.  The  use 
made  of  the  documents  actually  affronted  our  intelligence 
and  added  to  our  distrust. 

At  that  time  we  began  to  study  deliberately  the  problem 
as  to  which  nation  was  responsible  for  the  war.  It  is  now 
unnecessary  to  enter  into  the  details  of  this  question.  None 
of  the  nations  of  Europe  had  been  free,  the  world  had  not 
been  free,  from  a  species  of  intrusive,  aggressive  nationalism 
and  from  jealous  rivalry  in  trade  which  made  the  mainte- 
nance of  peace  exceedingly  difficult;  colonial  ambitions  and 
dollar  diplomacy  had  long  daily  threatened  the  peace  of  the 
world.  This  we  knew ;  but  even  if  no  one  nation  was  solely 
responsible  for  a  condition  which  made  the  maintenance  of 
peace  difficult,  we  were  compelled  to  conclude  that  the  out- 
break of  hostilities  was  primarily  chargeable  to  Germany; 
and,  as  we  realized  this,  we  became  certain  that  America 
would  hope  for  the  defeat  of  the  German  armies.  As  we 
studied  the  situation  it  became  plain  that  war  was  due  either 
to    a    national    panic    or    to    premeditated    determination    to 


SRLF 
YRL 


THE    GREAT    WAR. 


gain  territory  and  power  by  immediate  action.  The  whole 
mind  of  Germany  was  prepared  for  it;  war  and  armies,  en- 
gines of  destruction,  the  jealous  enmity  ascribed  to  for- 
eign nations,  the  loudly  proclaimed  perils  of  the  Father- 
land— those  things  kept  constantly  in  men's  minds  for 
years — laid  the  train  for  the  eonllagration.  That  the 
Teutonic  jiowers  deliberately  planned  a  war  in  1914  is 
indicated  by  considerable  evidence.  Though  to-day  some 
may  think  this  evidence  not  entirely  final  and  conclusive, 
it  doubtless  had  its  effect  on  everybody  acquainted  with  the 
history  of  the  last  decade.  This  at  least  appeared  certain : 
The  military  authorities  in  Germany,  directly  and  Avith 
amazing  forethought,  planned  for  a  war  which  must  come 
soon,  and  they  were  determined  to  win  for  the  country  a 
''place  in  the  sun"  and  establish  its  power.  If  authorities 
are  convinced  that  a  war  is  inevitable  and  approve  what  they 
confidently  believe  will  be  its  outcome,  are  they  not  likely  to 
grasp  the  favorable  moment  for  beginning  hostilities? 

It  is  sometimes  said  that  Germany  intended  to  dominate 
the  world.  We  had  great  difficulty  in  believing  in  the  ex- 
istence of  such  fantastic  ambitions,  but  we  came  slowly  to 
see  (1)  that  Germany  believed  in  the  superiority  of  German 
efificiency  and  of  German  culture,  and  thought  they  must  be 
made  triumphant;  (2)  that  at  least  the  ruling  classes  had 
a  curious  incapacity  to  understand  that  political  control  was 
not  necessary  to  the  extension  of  influence,  to  permeation  of 
thought,  and  even  to  the  development  of  trade;  (3)  that 
these  persons  were  determined  that  the  world  should  live 
in  awe  of  Germany,  and  if  rivals  threatened  to  prosper  they 
must  be  beaten  into  becoming  humility.^  Altliough  all  tliis 
is  probably  below  the  truth  it  is  so  preposterous  that  we  still 
have  moments  of  doubt;  and  yet  a  person  who  has  had  im- 
usual  opportunities  for  Imowing  the  situation,  and  has  but 
recently  returned,  after  some  years  of  residence  in  Germany, 
tells  us,  ''The  Battle  of  the  ]\Iarne  not  only  saved  the  allies — 
it  saved  Germany."  That  is  the  opinion  even  of  a  large 
part  of  the  people  of  Germany,     In  the  defeat  at  the  ]\Iarne 


1  If  anyone  disbelieves  the  understatement  above,  he  ought  to  read  "Hurrah 
and  Hallelujah,"  a  book  largely  made  up  of  documents  collected  by  a  I)aue, 
Prof,  J.  P.  Bung,  of  Copenhagen. 


b  THE    GREAT    WAR. 

the   hope   of   a  world    dominion   was   shattered.     The   lunacy 
of  the  war  lords  then  in  control  was  changed. 

Still,  as  we  began  to  realize  all  these  things,  we  did  not 
yet  feel  that  it  was  our  business  to  enter  the  conflict,  not 
even  when  we  came  to  see  that  America  herself  was  in  actual 
danger,  certainly  in  actual  and  immediate  danger  if  Germany 
was  not  defeated  by  the  allies.  We  were  loath  to  credit 
what  appears  to  be  the  truth,  that,  to  attribute  to  the  Kaiser 
the  offensive  words  of  Napoleon — America  was  within  the 
scope  of  his  policy.  Possibly  it  was  shameful  in  us  to  wait 
and  to  rely  on  the  allied  powers  when  we  began  to  feel  that 
this  defeat  imperiled  our  own  safety.  But  something  more 
than  fear  was  needed  to  force  us  into  the  fight;  not  until  the 
issues  were  clear  to  the  nations  of  the  world,  not  until  there 
was  hope  for  a  constructive  peace,  not  till  we  heard  the  call 
of  humanity  were  we  prepared  to  fling  in  our  power  and 
resources. 

Doubtless  our  final  entrance  into  the  conflict  was  brought 
about  by  cumulative  irritation  at  German  methods  and 
policies.  Our  conviction  of  their  unworthiness  grew  gradu- 
ally day  by  day.  This  conviction  was  the  result  of  experi- 
ence of  having  actually  lived  through  a  great  crisis.  Among 
these  irritations,  which  opened  our  eyes  and  hardened  our 
hearts,  none  was  more  powerful  than  the  machinations  of 
the  German  spies.  We  were  more  than  irritated,  avc  were 
enlightened;  we  discovered  what  WeltpoUtik  and  Realpolitik 
really  were ;  German  espionage  in  this  country  helped  us  to 
grasp  the  nature  of  a  principle  which  is  essentially  criminal 
and  which,  if  it  continues,  must  make  decent  international 
relationships  quite  impossible.  And  so  this  fact  began  to 
stand  out  strongly:  Democracy  can  not  survive  in  an  atmos- 
phere of  indecent  intrigue ;  the  Government  at  Washington 
was  forced  to  conclude  that  we  can  not  act  in  friendliness  or 
cooperate  with  a  government  whose  ways  are  devious, 
ungenerous,  purely  selfish,  and  unreliable. 

It  is  perhaps  unnecessary  to  speak  of  Zeppelin  raids, 
poisonous  gases,  and  deportation  of  men  and  women  from 
the  occupied  portions  of  France  and  Belgium,  although  Ave 
have  no  right  to  forget  these  facts;  they  are  natural  products, 
once    more,    of    militaristic    doctrine.     We    must    remember 


THE    GREAT    WAR.  7 

that,  if  war  means  these  horrors,  all  our  efforts  may  well  be 
directed  against  the  prolongation  of  war  and  the  success  of 
militarism.  Civilization  is  actually  at  stake  unless  some- 
thing can  be  done  to  establish  a  decent  working  order  among 
the  nations  of  the  Avorld.^ 

About  the  beginning  of  1915  Admiral  Tirpitz  was  reported 
to  have  made  a  statement  about  the  use  of  submarines  for 
destroying  merchantmen,  and  about  the  beginning  of 
February  an  effort  was  made  to  establish  a  war  zone  about 
the  British  Isles.  At  almost  exactly  the  same  time  England 
put  food  for  Germany  on  the  contraband  list,  her  technical 
excuse  being  that  Germany  had  taken  government  cliarge 
of  all  food  in  the  Empire  and  thus  could  use  all  of  her  food 
as  a  basis  of  war.  The  diplomatic  controversy  that  aro.se 
over  the  questions  of  contraband  and  blockade  and  war  zonas 
can  not  be  entered  upon  here  in  any  detail.  It  is  apparent 
to  my  mind  that  Germany  can  not  excuse  her  attacks  upon 
merchant  vessels  on  the  ground  that  she  was  merely  retaliat- 
ing against  the  British  policy  of  starvation,  though  it  is  not 
unlikely  that  Britain  would  have  attempted  to  use  her  fleet 
for  that  purpose  even  if  Germany  had  not  brought  her  sub- 
mersibles  into  play — just  as  Germany  starved  Paris  in  1870. 
And  especially  is  retaliation  not  tolerable  when  it  is  exercised 
without  any  reference  to  the  rights  and  lives  of  neutrals. 
If  Great  liritain  broke  the  rules  of  international  law  oi- 
violently  extended  them  for  her  purposes,  there  is  a  very 
marked  "difference  between  a  prize  court  and  a  torpedo." 
Moreover,  the  British  dispatches  to  this  Government  attempt- 
ing to  ju.stify  her  procedure  are  certainly  able  and  rest  in  no 
small  degree  on  our  own  acts  during  the  Civil  War, 

Britain  guarded  and  guided  our  trade  even  with  neutral 
countries  through  which  goods  could  be  sent  to  Germany; 
but  we  could  hardly  be  asked  to  do  more  than  register  com- 
plaint  in   the   hope   of   reserving   grounds    tor   reparation    ov 

J  Those  that  are  still  troubled  about  our  entrance  Into  the  war  should  remem- 
ber what  was  said  by  our  coniiiiissioiiers  wlio  liad  been  carryinK  on  rt'licf  work 
in  Belgium  "We  wish  to  tell  you,'  tbey  said  to  President  Wilson,  "that  there  Is 
no  Avord  In  your  historic  stateuiont  that  does  not  lind  a  response  In  all  our 
hearts.  ♦  *  *  Although  we  break  with  groat  regret  oiir  association  with 
many  German  individuals,  •  *  •  there  Is  no  hope  for  democracy  or  liberal- 
ism unless  the  system  which  brought  the  world  into  this  unfathomable  misery 
can  be  stamped  out  once  for  all." 


8  THE    GREAT    WAR, 

maintaining  the  technical  rules  of  law.  Did  we  have  ground 
for  claiming  damages?  Perhaps;  but  our  trade  prospered 
tremendously  and  increased  greatly  even  with  the  neutral 
countries  adjacent  to  Germany.^ 

"With  the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania,  j\Iay,  1915 — a  shameful 
and  premeditated  crime — President  Wilson  wrote  sharply 
to  the  German  Government  asserting  that  we  should  defend 
our  rights  upon  the  high  seas.  It  seemed  at  that  time  our 
evident  duty  to  maintain  as  much  as  possible  of  the  shattered 
fabric  of  international  law.  Although  some  persons  thought 
we  ought  to  enter  the  war  at  once,  the  President  was  not  at 
that  time  prepared  to  advise  such  action.  He  still  clung  to 
the  belief  or  the  hope  that  by  reiterated  declaration  of  the 
fundamental  principles  of  justice  and  humanity  Germany 
might  be  brought  to  a  reasonable  course  of  conduct  and  that 
some  of  the  principles  wrought  out  by  past  centuries  might 
be  preserved.  Wliat  is  the  value  of  international  law  if  it 
is  to  be  cast  to  the  winds  when  observance  is  inconvenient? 
After  the  Sussex  affair,  in  the  summer  of  1916,  our  relations 
with  the  German  Government  were  again  greatly  strained, 
but  President  Wilson  succeeded  in  getting  a  promise  that 
merchantmen  should  not  be  sunk  without  warning  and  with- 
out saving  lives  unless  the  vessel  should  resist  or  attempt  to 
escape.  This  promise  was  coupled  with  a  condition  that 
we  should  compel  Great  Britain  to  surrender  what  Berlin 
asserted  to  be  an  illegal  blockade.  Remembering,  possibly, 
the  net  into  which  Napoleon  enticed  James  IMadison  about 
107  years  ago,  our  Government  did  not  accept  the  condition, 
but  warned  Germany  that  her  obligations  Avere  "individual 
not  joint,  absolute  and  not  relative."  We  rested  easier;  but 
we  now  realized  that  this  willingness  to  forego  the  sinking  of 
peaceful  vessels  and  the  taking  of  lives  can  be  accounted  for 
by  the  fact  that  the  old  U  boats  were  being  destroyed  and 
the  Teutonic  powers  did  not  then  have  in  readiness  the  large 
and  improved  monsters  of  the  deep  with  which  to  carry  on 


*  While,  in  my  judgment,  Britain,  in  some  respects  broke  away  from  the  re- 
straints of  international  law  or  unduly  extended  precedents  that  appeared  to 
justify  her,  the  (lucstion  is  by  no  means  an  easy  one,  and  I  have  heard  an  able 
international  lawyer  say  that,  if  the  subject  were  submitted  to  an  impartial 
tribunal,  he  would  be  by  no  means  certain  of  a  decision  in  our  behalf. 


THE    GREAT    WAR,  9 

the  work  of  destruction.  Conditions  were  bad  enough 
during  the  latter  half  of  191G,  but  with  the  beginning  of 
the  new  year  ruthless  warfare  was  openly  and  brazenly 
instituted.  With  the  announcement  that  no  warning  would 
be  given  when  ships  were  sunk  within  a  war  zone  (1917) 
cutting  off  nearly  the  whole  coast  of  western  Europe, 
President  Wilson  sent  the  German  ambassador  home  and 
war  seemed  inevitable.  One  of  the  astounding  revelations 
of  the  political  methods  of  the  German  foreign  office  was  the 
announcement,  made  by  the  chancellor  to  the  Reichstag 
and  the  German  people,  that  President  Wilson  had  broken 
off  diplomatic  relations  abruptly,  although  the  step  was 
taken  18  months  or  more  after  the  exchange  of  dispatches  on 
the  Lusitania  crime  and  half  a  year  after  the  exchange  of  notes 
about  the  Sussex. 

So  far  we  have  given  only  a  meager  outline  of  the  story 
and  told  it  ineffectively,  for  not  even  in  many  words  can  one 
sketch  the  growing  uneasiness  and  distrust,  the  sense  of 
despair,  or  the  conflict  between  despair  and  hope.  Was  the 
world  falling?  Was  civilization  being  wrecked  in  the  whirl- 
wind of  barbaric  passion?  Had  Germany  already  destroyed 
civilization  by  bringing  the  world  to  see  that  there  could  be 
no  faith  between  nations,  and  that  at  any  juncture,  on  the 
spurious  plea  of  necessity,  frightful  wrong  could  be  com- 
mitted? If  this  war  ended  in  German  victory,  a  victory 
won  by  years  of  devoted  preparation,  a  victory  won  by 
submarines  and  Zeppelins  and  poisonous  gases  and  deporta- 
tion of  men,  Avomen,  and  children  to  work  in  the  fields  and 
factories  of  the  conquering  country,  what  was  before  the 
world?  German  victory  appeared  to  mean  the  success  of 
ruthlessness,  of  conquest  by  military  preparation ;  it  meant 
the  enthronement  of  might ;  and  it  meant  that  we  must 
henceforward  live  in  a  world  of  struggle — we  and  our  children 
after  us. 

Why  did  President  Wilson,  after  long  effort  to  maintain 
neutrality  and  even  hasten  the  coming  of  peace,  finally 
advocate  war?  Before  attempting  to  answer  this  question 
let  us  recall  the  President's  efforts  to  bring  the  conflicting 
nations  to  a  statement  of  their  terms,  and  to  hold  out  to  the 
world    the    conception    of    the    establishment    of    permanent 


10  THE  GREAT   WAR. 

peace.  The  President's  message  on  this  subject  came  out 
almost  simultaneously  with  Germany's  proposal  in  which 
she  suggested  peace  on  the  basis  of  an  assumed  victory  for 
her  army.  Such  a  peace  the  allied  nations  could  not  accept 
Avithout  accepting  militarism,  without  losing  the  all  important 
objects  for  which  millions  of  men  had  already  given  their 
lives;  and  probably  most  of  us  here  in  America  believe  that 
such  proposals  were  put  forth  chiefly  to  make  the  German 
people  believe  that  the  allies  were  the  aggressors  and  must 
bear  the  odium  of  further  conflict.  When  the  President  called 
on  the  warring  nations  to  state  their  terms  of  peace,  possibly 
he  still  cherished  the  hope  that,  if  terms  were  frankly  stated, 
negotiations  might  actually  be  begun;  almost  certainly  he 
desired  such  open  statement  as  would  show  to  the  world  at 
large  the  real  essence  of  the  conflict  and  also  show  that  we 
were  not  ready  to  enter  the  struggle  until  we  had  made 
every  possible  effort  to  bring  peace.  The  President's  appeal 
produced  no  very  tangible  results,  although  the  allied  powers 
stated  their  desires  and  purposes  with  considerable  definiteness, 
and  these  terms  did  not  on  the  whole  appear  to  us  unreasonable 
or  unworthy. 

All  through  this  time  the  President  and  all  thinking  Ameri- 
cans were  interested  chiefly  in  the  maintenance  of  civiliza- 
tion, and  they  looked  forward  not  merely  to  victory  or  to 
acquisition  of  territory  by  one  or  another  nation,  but  to  the 
foundation  of  a  lasting  peace  by  the  establishment  of  prin- 
ciples of  justice  and  reason.  We  found  that  we  could  not 
paint  in  too  dark  colors  the  future  of  the  world  if  we  are  all  to 
remain  under  the  pall  of  fear  and  suspicion  and  under  the 
overwhelming  burden  of  armament;  and  thus  we  came  to  see 
that  without  America's  entrance  into  this  war  there  was  little 
hope  for  relief  from  the  crushing  weight  of  war  and  the  almost 
equally  burdensome  weight  of  ever-increasing  armed  prep- 
aration. Never,  it  appeared,  in  the  long  history  of  mankind 
was  there  such  a  fearful  alternative;  never  a  louder  call  for 
duty.  America,  without  hope  of  profit,  with  no  mean  or  hid- 
den purpose,  must  herself  fight  to  maintain  the  principles  of 
civilization  and  for  the  hope  of  lasting  peace  and  propriety 
between  nations.  This  growing  belief  that  we  must  fight  for 
peace  only  gradually  conquered  most  of  us;  for  we  had  long 


THE   GREAT    WAR.  11 

believed  that  American  influence  for  peace  was  to  come  from 
remaining  peaceful;  and  for  this  principle,  we  may  still 
maintain,  there  is  much  to  be  said.  The  creative  forces  of 
the  world,  we  may  still  remind  ourselves,  have  sprung  from 
character.  America,  by  her  successes  in  popular  govern- 
ment, by  a  reasonable  amount  of  respect  for  herself,  has 
helped  to  build  up  the  democratic  spirit  and  the  democratic 
power  from  Peking  to  Petrograd  and  from  London  to  Quebec 
and  Melbourne. 

This,  I  say,  we  believed.  But  several  things  showed  us  that 
this  just  idealism  is  for  the  present  impracticable.  (1) 
German  philosophy  scouts  and  flouts  the  notion  that  a  state 
must  not  use  its  power  to  dash  down  opposition.  (2)  Ger- 
man success  would  mean  the  victory  of  MachtpoUtik — a 
victory  for  the  very  forces  which  pacific  idealism  decries. 
(3)  If  we  expected  to  bring  into  the  world  an  appreciation  of 
rights  and  duties,  if  we  hoped  for  influence  in  the  adjustment 
of  world  afl:airs,  if  we  wished  to  see  a  world  we  could  live  in, 
it  was  necessary  in  time  of  trouble  to  do  our  part.  The 
President  had  striven  not  only  for  our  rights,  but  for  the 
maintenance  of  law.  Under  much  harsh  criticism  at  home 
he  went  to  the  very  limits  of  proposals;  he  offered  his  assist- 
ance; he  announced  that  there  was  such  a  thing  as  being 
"too  proud  to  flght;"  he  spoke  of  ''peace  without  victory;" 
he  hoped  that  the  war  could  be  settled  in  such  a  way  that  the 
nations  after  the  war  could  live  without  hatred;  he  insisted 
that  the  world  must  be  based  on  an  organization,  not  for  war, 
but  for  peace  and  good  neighborhood.  But  strive  or  struggle 
as  he  might,  it  became  daily  more  apparent  that  we  should 
have  little  or  nothing  to  say  after  the  war,  if  we,  unwilling  to 
act  now,  called  upon  the  nations  to  enter  into  a  league  of 
peace  or  summoned  them  to  the  establishment  of  a  new 
world  order.  If  we  held  back,  contenting  ourselves  with  verbal 
threats  and  coaxings,  Ave  should  not  have  a  single  friend  in 
the  wide  world  unsuspicious  of  our  motives. 

Thus  far  I  have  said  little  about  the  actual  attacks  on 
American  rights  and  property.  It  is  not  necessary  to  say 
much,  though  they  reached  into  the  intolerable.  Nor  do  I 
wish  to  dwell  on  affronts  to  American  honor,  for  I  do  not 
highly  value  the  code  of  the  duelist.     "We  can  well  remem- 


12  "  THE    GREAT    WAR. 

ber,  even  in  international  affairs,  that  no  one  but  one's  self 
can  stain  one's  honor,  and  that  no  nation  can  smirch  another 
nation's  spirit.  We  were,  as  I  have  said,  confronted  by  a 
world  situation  in  which  we  must  play  a  strong,  manly,  and 
honorable  part.  We  despaired  of  a  world  in  which  millions 
of  people  could  be  thrown  into  war;  millions  of  young  men 
could  be  buried  in  trenches  on  the  battle  field  or  left  to  rot 
under  the  festering  sun  of  France  or  Poland ;  millions  of 
children  could  be  beggared  or  stricken  by  disease,  because 
an  emperor  and  secret  government  had  willed  it  so,  or  be- 
cause nations  could  not  learn  the  simple  lessons  of  decent 
intercourse.  What  untold  anguish  might  have  been  saved 
had  the  impetuous,  sword-proud  William  consented  to  dis- 
cussion, as  Britain  pleadingly  asked  him  to  do  during  the  last 
days  of  July,  1914. 

In  his  war  message,  April  2,  President  Wilson  announced 
that  the  American  people  felt  no  hostility  to  the  German 
people,  but  that  we  could  deal  no  longer  with  an  ambitious, 
autocratic  Government  which  cast  a  nation  into  war  with 
no  apparent  hesitation  and  without  discussing  their  wishes. 
We  are  told,  even  in  these  days,  that  there  is  no  distinction 
between  the  people  and  the  Government  of  Germany,  and 
that  to  assert  such  dualism  is  to  disregard  the  most  evident 
fact.  Certainly  the  great  masses  of  the  people  have  sacri- 
ficed their  lives  for  the  Fatherland,  and  yet  one  of  the  most 
whimsical  products  of  this  war  is  that  some  men  here  in 
America  should  be  asserting  the  unqualified  serenity  of  the 
political  atmosphere  of  Berlin  just  when  William  announced 
that  this  war  had  taught  him  the  faithfuhiess  and  reliability 
of  the  common  people  and  that  political  changes  must  come, 
and  when  Hollweg  told  the  junkers  that  their  day  of  domi- 
nation is  nearing  its  end.  William  has  been  taught  some- 
thing by  the  war.  Did  he  have  to  see  a  million  Germans 
slaughtered,  did  he  have  to  hear  the  cries  of  the  widows  and 
the  fatherless,  did  he  have  to  see  blinded  men  learning  their 
letters  and  crippled  boys  creeping  along  the  streets  of  Berlin, 
before  he  could  learn  that  the  people  could  be  trusted? 
Every  recent  incident  in  Germany  has  demonstrated  the 
wealmess,  not  to  say  the  criminality,  of  the  imperial  political 
regime. 


THE    GREAT    WAR.  13 

"Still,"  some  person  will  say,  "Germany  is  not  what  Russia 
was.  To  class  Russia,  with  its  cruel,  cheap,  mercenary 
bureaucracy  and  Germany  together  as  autocracies  is  to  do 
violence  to  patent  facts."  I  shall  not  seek  to  show  how 
nearly  the  governmental  system  of  the  Empire  approaches 
in  reality  the  autocratic  type  and  how  largely  the  responsi- 
bility for  all  imperial  acts  rests  in  the  hands  of  the  Prussian 
King  and  a  body  of  irreconcilable  aristocrats.  Of  this  much 
could  be  said,  but  we  can  omit  all  discussion  of  the  quasi- 
representative  institutions  of  the  Empire.  The  trouble  is 
deeper  than  mere  forms  of  Government;  for  the  circle  that 
shaped  the  policy  of  the  State  lived — this  at  least  must  be 
said — within  a  wall  of  psychological  superiority  and  incul- 
cated obedience  as  the  great  end  of  being.  Every  effort  was 
made  even  to  convince  the  German  people  of  their  exclusive 
and  seclusive  superiority,  and  William  himself,  a  "king  by 
the  grace  of  God,"  was  not  able  to  see  what  a  tragic,  pathetic, 
and  humorous  figure  he  made  in  the  modern  world  of  modern 
men.  The  whole  psychological  situation  produced  a  disloca- 
tion of  realities  and  a  distortion  of  living  truths. 

The  present  war  makes  us  comrades  in  arms  of  the  two 
great  popular  Governments  of  western  Europe,  Great  Britain 
and  France.  We  have,  I  think,  no  real  or  fancied  interest  in 
mere  territorial  readjustment  which  would  add  to  the  power 
of  either  of  these  nations,  but  we  are  justified  in  having  con- 
fiidence  in  the  democracy  of  France  and  the  liberal  forces  of 
Great  Britain.  Our  sympathy  for  France  ought  to  teach  us 
a  great  lesson.  It  shows  us  that  republics  are  not  ungrateful 
and  that,  after  the  lapse  of  140  years,  despite  quarrels  and 
disputes  with  the  French  Government,  we  are  still  bound 
down  by  sentimental  ties  of  gratitude  to  France.  We  have 
come  to  see  the  undying  strength  of  friendship  between  the 
masses  of  men  and  are  given  new  hope  that  democracies,  if 
they  are  willing  to  think,  can  not  make  war  upon  one  another 
impetuously  and  in  hatred.  For  England  we  still  cherish, 
unfortunately,  some  of  the  old  grievances  that  have  been 
carried  do^^^l,  decade  by  decade,  and  taught  through  our 
school  books  to  each  succeeding  generation.  We  have  not 
been  properly  taught  to  see  that  our  o\vn  Revolution  wa.s  an 
English  revolution,  in  which  Englishmen  of  this  side  of  the 


14  THE    GREAT    WAR. 

ocean  were  striving  for  the  development  and  maintenance  of 
liberty,  and  that  that  war,  too,  was  a  war  against  an  arrogant 
leaden-headed  aristocracy.  Misunderstanding  of  Britain 
comes  from  the  failure  to  appreciate  the  development  of 
liberalism  in  her  Government,  until  she  stands  forth  to-day 
as  a  great  representative  of  democracy  and  of  belief  in  the 
power  and  will  of  the  common  people. 

To  lose  sight  of  England's  transformation,  in  which  we 
have  had  a  great  part,  is  to  lose  sight  of  one  of  the  most 
momentous  developments  of  the  last  hundred  years.  Can 
we  not  forget  crazy  old  George  III  and  Lord  North  and  the 
rest  of  his  tribe,  and  remember  the  men  of  the  middle  cen- 
tury, the  creators  of  modern  British  liberalism — Cobden, 
Bright,  and  Gladstone,  and  a  myriad  of  bold  commoners — 
who  battled  successfully  to  destroy  "the  fortress  of  feudal- 
ism"? Can  we  not  learn  how  deeply  we  are  involved  in 
the  mighty  structure  of  the  British  Empire  as  we  find  the 
lessons  of  our  own  Revolution  and  of  our  later  history 
wrought  into  the  policy  of  world-wide  dominion?  Can  we 
not  see  that  the  greatest  empire  of  all  history  has  been  built 
on  the  lessons  of  liberty  which  Britain  learned  from  George 
Washington  and  Abraham  Lincoln?  Can  we  not  see  the 
tremendous  force  of  democracy  and  individual  liberty  when 
we  know  that  thousands  upon  thousands  of  colonials  gave 
their  lives  "ungrudgingly  at  Galipoli  and  Ypres?  Surely  we 
must  come  to  see  that  a  democracy  like  France  or  a  demo- 
cratic empire  like  Great  Britain  runs  our  own  risks,  faces  our 
own  dangers,  is  subject  to  the  faults  and  blunders  which  we 
know  so  well,  and  that  we  are  not  misled  if  the  result  of  our 
efforts  is  to  uphold  a  structure  of  imperial  order  based  on  the 
principles  of  justice,  the  strength  of  which  has  been  so  dramat- 
ically shown  in  the  past  three  years.  Sometimes  one  is 
asked  ironically  when,  forsooth,  England  became  the  friend 
of  America.  The  answer  can  be  quickly  given,  and  given 
M'ith  absolute  historical  accuracy.  It  was  when  the  Brit- 
ish Parliament  in  1867  passed  the  second  reform  bill  and 
England  became  a  democracy — about  two  years  and  a  half 
after  the  English  aristocrats  had  fully  seen  their  mistakes 
during  our  Civil  War  and  had  come  to  see  that  the  greatest 


THE    GREAT    WAR.  15 

statesman  the  nineteenth  century  had  as  yet  produced  wjis 
not  born  in  a  manor  house  on  an  English  countryside,  hut  in 
a  log  cabin  in  Kentucky.  Likewise  it  can  probably  be  safely 
said  that  France  became  our  real  friend,  a  nation  with  which 
we  could  work  Avith  open  friendliness,  when,  with  the  down- 
fall of  Napoleon  TIT,  the  republican  institutions  of  France 
were  finally  and  firmly  established. 

In  the  conduct  of  this  w'ar  ^ve  must  constantly  remember 
that  w^e  have  had  hopes  of  rendering  the  world  safe  for  democ- 
racy. "With  all  our  frailties,  which  we  must  openly  con- 
fess, with  all  our  wastefulness  and  with  all  onr  follies,  this 
war  has  taught  us,  as  nothing  else  could,  that  there  is  noth- 
ing upon  which  we  can  more  safely  rely  than  the  plain  sense 
of  the  plain  people.  Perhaps  nothing  shows  this  more  con- 
clusively than  our  reluctance  and  distaste  for  military  con- 
quest and  our  hesitation  in  making  up  our  minds  to  fight. 
We  may  continually  remember  the  words  of  Lord  John 
Eussell — and  no  one  better  than  he  had  reason  to  laiow  the 
truth:  "All  experience  of  human  nature  teaches  us  the  fact, 
that  men  who  possess  a  superiority,  real  or  imaginary,  over 
their  fellow  creatures  will  abuse  the  advantages  they  en- 
joy." We  must  remember  that  we  entered  the  war  for 
peace,  and  we  are  offering  a  great  sacrifice  for  a  new  world 
order.  We  believed  that  we  could  not  get  it  by  chiding 
Europe  and  refusing  to  do  our  part  now,  for  Europe  needed 
the  assistance  of  an  external  power,  disinterested  and  high- 
hearted. We  may  remember  that  we  have  covered  a  conti- 
nent almost  as  large  as  the  whole  of  Europe  with  self- 
governing  Commonwealths.  We  may  remember  the  unselfish 
side  of  the  Monroe  doctrine  which  we  try  to  live  up  to 
as  embodying  a  belief  that  nations  may  live  their  own  lives; 
and  we  can  call  attention  to  ^Mexico,  which  we  have  allowed 
to  wallow  in  revolutions  and  destroy  American  lives  and 
property  because  we  believe  that  only  by  trial  can  nations 
rise  and  that  every  nation  is  entitled  to  its  own  undisturbed 
revolution  if  there  is  hope  for  the  struggling  masses.  And 
wnthal  we  must  strive  to  save  our  own  real  selves,  our  ovra 
essential  character;  for  what  would  it  profit  us  if  we  fought 
the  whole  world  and  lost  ourselves?     We  now  know,  if  never 


16  THE    GREAT   WAR. 

before,  that  war  is  horrible  and  demoniacally  ridiculous; 
that  peaceful  relations  between  nations  have  been  endangered 
by  intrigue,  greed,  false  pride,  covetousness,  and  suspicion ; 
that  big  armies  do  not  make  for  peace,  but  beget  arro- 
gance; that  human  misconduct  and  discourtesy  may  make 
enemies,  and  that  nothing  is  more  vitiating  than  unmanly 
envy  or  fear  of  a  prosperous  neighbor;  that  democracy 
must  be  the  basis  of  a  sound  political  system,  but  it  must 
be  real,  conscientious,  intelligent,  and  open-minded,  or  we 
may  plunge  into  cataclysmic  anarchy.  We  may  all  take  cour- 
age in  remembering  that  the  President  of  the  United  States 
has  led  us  reluctantly  and  with  unwnlling  feet  into  a  war 
which  we  believe  will  help  to  establish  democracy,  humanity, 
and  a  sense  of  national  duty  without  profit. 


